¿La competencia realmente está a un click de distancia? Propuestas antitrust para Silicon Valley

Serguei KOMISSAROV

Resumen


Este trabajo analiza regulaciones antimonopolio para Facebook y Google, junto a sus efectos sobre la competencia, en el mercado de las plataformas digitales. Una combinación de economías de escala, externalidades de red, y la extracción, recolección, almacenamiento y análisis de datos personales permite que ambas empresas detenten poder de mercado dentro de la publicidad digital. Su posición dominante incrementa el precio a los anunciantes publicitarios, deteriora la privacidad de los usuarios, afecta el libre flujo de información en la red, e impide la innovación tecnológica. En 2019, estas conductas anticompetitivas motivaron la investigación de las autoridades estadounidenses sobre las industrias de Silicon Valley. Este artículo examina posibles regulaciones económicas que promuevan la competencia en el sector.


Palabras clave


plataformas digitales; regulación antimonopolio; competencia;

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Referencias


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.16921/chasqui.v1i142.4106

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